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SETTING: Between October 1992 and February 1994,
33 cases of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB)
were diagnosed among patients infected by the human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and hospitalised in an
HIV ward in Milan, Italy. This outbreak was part of a
much larger outbreak, begun in another hospital and
probably transferred through a patient.
OBJECTIVE: To evaluate risk factors for transmission
and the effectiveness of infection control measures.
DESIGN: 1) Active follow-up of exposed patients, 2)
cohort study among HIV-infected patients exposed to
MDR-TB cases before and after the implementation of
control measures, 3) screening of close contacts of MDR-
TB cases, and 4) molecular typing by restriction frag-
ment length polymorphism (RFLP) analysis.
RESULTS: The risk of MDR-TB was higher in patients
with lower CD4 lymphocyte percentages and longer
duration of exposure. No difference in the daily risk was
observed for in-patients vs day-hospital patients or by
room distance from an infectious case. Of the 90
patients exposed before the implementation of infection
control measures (i.e., October 1992–June 1993) 26
(28.9%) developed MDR-TB, whereas none of the 44
patients exclusively exposed after implementation devel-
oped MDR-TB, despite the continuing presence of infec-
tious MDR-TB cases in the ward.
CONCLUSION: Simple control measures were effective
in significantly reducing nosocomial transmission among
patients.
KEY WORDS: tuberculosis; Mycobacterium tuberculo-
sis; multidrug resistance; outbreak; HIV infection; infec-
tion control measures; effectiveness
IN THE UNITED STATES, in recent years large out-
breaks of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB)
have occurred involving institutional settings, mainly
hospitals, where patients infected with the human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) were prevalent.1–4 In
Europe, nosocomial outbreaks of both drug-
susceptible5 and MDR-TB have been reported.6–8
Nosocomial transmission of TB has been associ-
ated with inadequate TB control programmes and
facilities. To reduce the risk of transmission of TB in
hospital, the US Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention (CDC) has issued, and regularly updates, spe-
cific guidelines,9 which include the implementation of
infection control measures at different levels (i.e.,
administrative measures to reduce the risk of expo-
sure, engineering control, and the use of personal res-
piratory protective equipment).
From October 1992 to February 1994, 116 TB
cases of TB due to Mycobacterium tuberculosis
strains resistant to seven drugs occurred among HIV-
infected patients cared for in two large urban hospi-
tals in Milan, Italy.10 The outbreak began in 1991 in
one hospital and was probably transferred to the
other hospital through a patient. In this second hos-
pital, all of the patients exposed during the outbreak
period were actively followed up, a cohort study was
performed to evaluate the risk factors for transmis-
sion and the effectiveness of infection control mea-
sures, and close contacts of MDR-TB cases in the
community were screened. This report summarises
the results of the follow-up investigation for assess-
ing the efficacy of the infection control measures
implemented and the impact of the outbreak on the
community.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
Case finding
A case of MDR-TB was defined as any patient admit-
ted to Niguarda-Ca’ Granda Hospital, a large general
hospital in Milan, between October 1992 and March
1994 who had clinical signs and symptoms consistent
with TB and an M. tuberculosis isolate resistant to at
least isoniazid, rifampicin, streptomycin and etham-
butol. Microbiology records of the hospital were
reviewed to identify patients from whom M. tuber-
culosis had been isolated from January 1992 to
March 1994 and to document the drug susceptibility
patterns of the isolates from these patients. Medical
records were reviewed to verify that the clinical
course in these patients was consistent with TB. All
patients cared for at the HIV ward during the epi-
demic period and subsequently hospitalised in other
health care facilities were traced in April 1995 to
identify additional TB cases and to collect available
M. tuberculosis strains.
Epidemiological studies
To identify the individual characteristics and the type
of care associated with an increased risk of MDR-TB,
a cohort study was conducted among HIV-infected
patients hospitalised in the ward implicated and
whose hospital stay overlapped the infectious periods
of MDR-TB patients in this ward.
The following definitions were used: 1) infectious
period for each MDR-TB case: the interval from 2
weeks before collection of an acid-fast bacilli (AFB)
smear-positive sputum until the first negative M.
tuberculosis culture or last contact with the HIV
ward. 2) Infectious MDR-TB patient-day: any day
during which an infectious case was present in the HIV
ward. 3) Susceptible period: for non-cases, the time
between first admission and last discharge; for cases,
this was truncated at 5 weeks before the day of col-
lection of the first positive specimen (culture or
microscopy). The specific period of 5 weeks was
based on an estimated delay of 2 weeks between onset
of symptoms and obtaining a first positive specimen
(diagnostic delay) plus an estimated minimum of
three weeks of incubation.11 4) Patient-day of expo-
sure: any day (within the susceptible period), in which
a patient was present on the same floor as an infec-
tious MDR-TB case. 5) Incubation period: the inter-
val between the midpoint of the exposure period (first
and last exposure to an infectious MDR-TB patient)
and 2 weeks before the first positive culture.
Despite the fact that many hospitalised patients
were seen in the hospital’s out-patient HIV clinic, only
three infectious MDR-TB patient-days occurred in
that clinic. Moreover, not all visits to the HIV clinic
were recorded. Therefore, out-patient exposures were
excluded from further analysis. Overall, 244 HIV-
infected patients were exposed as in-patients. Seventy-
three were excluded from the cohort analysis: 36 pa-
tients who survived less than 4 months from their first
day of exposure, seven MDR-TB cases with known ex-
posures to other cases both outside and within the
HIV ward, seven patients who developed TB but for
whom the antibiotic susceptibility pattern was un-
known, and 23 patients who were lost to follow-up
after discharge and for whom it was thus not possible to
retrieve the medical history through active surveillance.
Medical and nursing charts were reviewed to
retrieve information on patients’ demographic and
clinical characteristics, the room(s) in which they
were hospitalised, type of hospitalisation (in-patient
or day-hospital), prior contacts with MDR-TB cases
in other facilities, and clinical outcome. Dates of pen-
tamidine administration were not available at the
time of the survey. Incidence rates per 100 patients
and rates per 1000 patient-days of exposure were cal-
culated both for the periods before and after 30 June
1993, the date by which the strict infection control
measures that were introduced in May had been fully
implemented (see below). To identify the patients’ hos-
pitalisation characteristics associated with the risk of
developing MDR-TB, relative risks comparing inci-
dence rates for exposed and non-exposed patients were
calculated, including only those patients exclusively
exposed before 30 June 1993.
Laboratory methods
Microscopy (Ziehl-Neelsen stain) and culture on
International Union Tuberculosis Medium (IUTM
medium) were performed at the hospital laboratory.
A regional reference laboratory performed species
identification (biochemical tests plus DNA probe)
and antimicrobial susceptibility using the propor-
tional method on solid medium. An independent lab-
oratory performed restriction fragment length poly-
morphism (RFLP) using IS6110 probe with standard
methods,12 on M. tuberculosis isolates still available
at the time of investigation. Polymerase chain reac-
tion (PCR) for identification of M. tuberculosis from
clinical specimens became available in the hospital in
May 1993.
Facility and infection control measures
The HIV ward (17 rooms, 2–3 beds per room) is
located on two different floors of a free-standing
building of Niguarda hospital in Milan. The first floor
has three day-hospital rooms and a room for inhala-
tion therapy (aerosolised pentamidine). These rooms
are contiguous with the in-patient rooms. The out-
patient clinic is located on the ground floor and has a
separate entrance. All in-patient rooms have ante-
rooms and independent bathrooms. The building has
no air-conditioning system and no air filtration/
decontamination equipment. Until recognition of the
outbreak, patients with an AFB smear-positive spu-
tum and/or treated with full course of antituberculo-
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sis therapy were isolated in any available room in the
ward, either alone or, on occasion, with other TB
patients under treatment. Compliance with isolation
procedures was not complete, and prohibition of TB
patients from moving outside their rooms was not
always followed. Bronchoalveolar lavage was usually
performed in the patient’s room. Patients were trans-
ported to other hospital departments for X-rays and
other diagnostic procedures.
No routine policy was in place for the periodic
screening of health care workers (HCW), who by Ital-
ian law are required to be vaccinated with the bacille
Calmette Guérin (BCG).
After recognition of the outbreak, strict AFB isola-
tion precautions were initiated in May 1993 for all
patients with respiratory disease or fever. These mea-
sures consisted of placing the patients in single rooms,
with doors always closed, and strict control of patient
adherence to isolation. The measures also called for
limitation of transportation outside the room or
building for diagnostic purposes and use of surgical
masks during transport. Respiratory protection (i.e.,
surgical masks) was mandatory for persons entering
all patient rooms. Finally, day-hospital admissions
were restricted to patients without acute respiratory
symptoms and/or fever. Pentamidine administration
was discontinued. All of these measures had been
fully implemented by June 1993.
Investigation of household contacts
The results of the screening conducted by local public
health personnel on household contacts of MDR-TB
cases were collected. In June 1994, unscreened con-
tacts were identified and screened with the Mantoux
test (5 tuberculin units [TU] of purified protein deriv-
ative [PPD]). Mantoux negative contacts were fol-
lowed up at 3 and 6 months; positive contacts were
clinically and radiographically examined both ini-
tially and after 6 months. HIV testing was offered
when appropriate, and in these cases anergy testing
was carried out along with Mantoux testing.
Screening of HCWs
Because periodic tuberculin screening had not been in
place before the recognition of the outbreak, skin test
conversion could not be determined. Exposed HCWs
were screened with Mantoux in June 1993 and once
again in 1994. Skin test positive persons and con-
verters were evaluated by chest X-ray.
Statistical analysis
A programme written in Clipper 5.0 was used to cal-
culate the number of patient-days of exposure and
infectious MDR-TB patient-days for each patient in
the cohort. Data were analysed using Epi Info (Ver-
sion 6, CDC). Categorical variables were analysed
using the 2 or Fisher’s exact two-tailed tests. Contin-
uous variables were compared using the Kruskall-
Wallis test for two groups. Relative risks (RR) and
95% confidence intervals (95%CIs) were calculated.
RESULTS
Case characteristics and description of the outbreak
Between October 1992 and March 1994, 49 patients
hospitalised in the HIV ward were identified as hav-
ing culture-confirmed TB, 29 of whom (59.2%) met
the case definition of MDR-TB. No MDR-TB isolate
was identified either in patients admitted to other
hospital wards or during the first months of 1992 in
the hospital under study. Four additional MDR-TB
cases were diagnosed in other hospitals, in patients pre-
viously hospitalised in the HIV ward, three of whom
were identified through active surveillance. Case char-
acteristics have been described in detail elsewhere.10
The index case was admitted to the second floor of
the hospital on 24 August 1992, with fever and
cough. Due to slow growth, M. tuberculosis was
identified only in February 1993 in a specimen col-
lected at the end of October 1992; the drug sensitivity
test results were available in March 1993. The patient
died on 10 December 1992. He had had no prior TB
diagnosis or treatment and no previous contact with
the HIV ward. From 9 July to 17 August 1992, he had
been hospitalised in another HIV ward in Milan,
where MDR-TB cases occurred during 1992.10
Of the 33 cases, 26 had previous exposures in the HIV
ward only, whereas seven had no known exposure or
had multiple exposures. Of these seven patients, three
(including the index case) had been exposed to MDR-TB
in the other hospital where the outbreak occurred,10
one had no known previous contact with the HIV
ward and had been in prison in the 6 months before
diagnosis, two were HIV-positive partners of MDR-
TB patients, and one was exposed to MDR-TB both
at Niguarda hospital and, for a longer period of time,
in a hospital outside Milan. The incubation periods
ranged from 31 to 218 days (median 90 days, mean
102.0, SD 43.6). Among the 26 cases with exposure
in the HIV ward only, the median interval between
the first observed exposure to an MDR-TB case and
the date of death was 241 days (range 132–939). All
33 cases died.
Cohort study
Overall, 171 patients were included in the cohort
study, including the 26 cases (15.2%) who had been
exposed in the HIV ward only and 145 HIV-infected
patients who did not develop MDR-TB. The median
length of hospitalisation was 39 days. Neither age nor
sex were associated with an increased risk of MDR-
TB. MDR-TB case patients had a significantly lower
CD4 lymphocyte percentage than patients who did
not develop MDR-TB (median 1.85%, range 0.1–9 vs
median 7.45%, range 0–45.5; Kruskall-Wallis test
12.7, P value 0.001).
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Among the 90 patients exposed from October
1992 to June 1993 (2455 patient-days), 26 (28.9%)
developed MDR-TB (10.6/1000 patient-days).
None of the 44 patients exposed exclusively after
30 June 1993 (654 patient-days), when infection con-
trol measures were already fully implemented, subse-
quently developed MDR-TB, despite the continuing
presence of several infectious MDR-TB cases in the
ward (Figure). Furthermore, no MDR-TB cases were
observed among the 37 cases exposed both before
and after 30 June 1993 (1839 patient-days). When
including these 37 patients to estimate the MDR-TB
rate before implementation of the infection control
measures, the incidence rate is 20.5% (6.1/1000
patient-days).
The factors associated with an increased risk of
MDR-TB were further analysed in the group of
patients exposed only before 30 June 1993. The risk
of MDR-TB was significantly higher in patients with
longer duration of exposure: the median length of
exposure to infectious patients among MDR-TB cases
was 40 days (range 6–113) compared to 9 days (range
1–83) for those who did not develop MDR-TB
(Kruskall-Wallis 16.6; P  0.00005). The cumulative
incidence of MDR-TB was significantly higher in
those exposed as in-patients compared to those
exposed in the day-hospital only, but the incidence
per 1000 patient-days of exposure was the same
(Table). Most of the 33 patients attending only the
day-hospital had a short duration of exposure: of the
27 with 5 days of exposure, none developed MDR-
TB, whereas among the six patients exposed for more
than 5 days, three developed MDR-TB (Fisher’s exact
test P  0.004). Among in-patients, the MDR-TB rate/
100 patients appeared to be twice as high (33.8%)
among patients whose hospital rooms were located
within two rooms of an infectious case than among
those whose rooms were further away (16.0%), but this
difference was not significant; rates per 1000 patient-
days of exposure were the same in the two groups.
Figure Number of infectious MDR-TB patient-days per month, October 1992–December 1993
(only patients exposed exclusively before 30 June 1993).
Table Frequency of MDR-TB by hospitalisation characteristics
Risk factors
No. of
patients
Incidence 
rate/100
patients
Relative risk
(95% confidence
interval)
No. of
patient-days
Incidence
rate/1000
patient-days
Relative risk
(95% confidence
interval)
Type of admission
In-patients only 32 37.5 4.13 (1.28–13.26) 1020 11.8 1.07 (0.30–3.81)
In-patients and day-hospital 25 44.0 4.84 (1.51–15.53) 1170 9.4 0.86 (0.24–3.08)
Day-hospital only 33 9.1 1.0 274 10.9 1.0
Distance from infectious cases
0–2 rooms 65 33.8 2.12 (0.81–5.53) 1969 11.2 1.38 (0.48–4.01)
2 rooms 25 16.0 1.0 495 8.1 1.0
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Household contacts
Of the 90 household contacts identified, 84 (93.3%)
were screened either routinely or during investigation
and 68 (75.6%) completed the scheduled 6-month
follow-up. Five of the 84 screened contacts were HIV-
positive and all of them were successfully followed-up
at 6 months. Three of the five were found to have
MDR-TB (including cases 31 and 33 in the Figure)
and one had a documented skin test conversion.
Among the 63 HIV-negative contacts successfully fol-
lowed, one MDR-TB case was observed in the ini-
tially Mantoux-negative partner of an MDR-TB case.
Moreover, three skin-test conversions occurred
(8.3% of the 36 initially negative contacts): two were
2-year-old children and one was an elderly woman.
Surveillance of HCWs
No case of TB disease was diagnosed among the 108
exposed HCWs. Of 55 HCWs who consented to
Mantoux testing, 22 (41.8%) were positive in June
1993. Three skin-test conversions were observed
among the 26 HCWs retested in 1994.
Laboratory results
Among the 33 case-patients, all M. tuberculosis iso-
lates were resistant to four of the first-line antituber-
culosis drugs isoniazid, rifampicin, streptomycin and
ethambutol. Isolates from 28 patients (84.8%) were
tested against six additional drugs. Two were resis-
tant to pyrazinamide, another first-line drug, all were
resistant to amikacin, kanamicyn, and teryzidon, 23
(82.1%) were resistant to cycloserin, and 17 (60.7%)
to ofloxacin. Time from specimen collection to the
availability of results of drug susceptibility patterns
was 4–6 months.
For the 33 MDR-TB cases, 27 M. tuberculosis iso-
lates were available for RFLP typing (22 with prior
exposure in the HIV ward only, two exposed in the
HIV ward and in another hospital, the two partners,
and the patient who had been incarcerated); of the 20
non-MDR-TB cases diagnosed in the HIV ward in the
same period, four M. tuberculosis isolates were avail-
able. MDR-TB isolates showed an identical pattern in
all 22 hospitalised cases, in the two partners, and in the
patient who had been incarcerated. The strain of
the index case was not available for RFLP typing.
The four non-MDR-TB patients showed different
RFLP patterns.
DISCUSSION
The MDR-TB outbreak discussed in the present
paper was part of a much larger outbreak which
began in another hospital in Milan in 1991 and
whose general features have been described else-
where.10 Given the availability of data on exposure
(such as hospital rooms), it was possible to conduct a
cohort study in this hospital to evaluate the factors
associated with TB transmission and the effectiveness
of the infection control measures adopted.
There are both similarities and differences between
this and other previously described nosocomial
MDR-TB outbreaks. As in all previous outbreaks, the
nosocomial transmission was strongly suggested by
all the epidemiological and laboratory evidence; all
the cases were HIV-infected and had lower CD4
T-lymphocyte counts than other HIV-infected patients
who were exposed but who did not develop the dis-
ease; the incubation period was brief, and the fatality
rate was extremely high, with a short survival time.1
In contrast with previous outbreaks, however, the
incidence rate among patients exposed before the im-
plementation of infection control measures was par-
ticularly high.13–15 Several factors may have contrib-
uted to aggravating transmission within the ward:
facilities for respiratory isolation were not adequate
and compliance of patients with infection control
measures was not complete; considerable delays
occurred in drug susceptibility testing; the periods of
exposure (i.e., hospital stays) were long; and finally,
the high proportion of patients with very low CD4
counts contributed to the dimension of the outbreak.
The cohort study showed that the risk of MDR-TB
transmission was higher in patients with longer dura-
tion of exposure to infectious patients and that the
risk per patient-day of exposure to an infectious case
was similar both in the ward and in the day-hospital.
However, fewer patients acquired the disease in the
day-hospital compared to the HIV ward, since most
of the patients in the day-hospital only had short
exposures. In other outbreaks, distance from infec-
tious patients was associated with a significant increased
risk of infection13–15 as a consequence of the airborne
spread of infectious droplet nuclei in the common
spaces. In the present outbreak, among patients
exposed to the index case, the incidence rates were
higher among patients in adjoining rooms, although
paradoxically high rates were also seen in patients who
were hospitalised in the most distant rooms. The lack
of a distance effect may have been due to the inade-
quacy of facilities for respiratory isolation and to the
poor compliance of patients with the movement limi-
tations in the ward. An additional factor was that
after the first few months of the outbreak, a large
number of infectious cases was present in the ward at
any given time, resulting in a highly diffuse exposure
to infectious cases.
The long follow-up period (up to April 1995) and
the active search for patients who, after being ex-
posed during the outbreak period, moved or were ad-
mitted to other hospitals, allowed us to evaluate
whether the intervention reduced the risk of person-
to-person nosocomial transmission of TB. No further
cases were detected that could be traced to exposure
in the HIV ward after 30 June 1993, although several
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infectious MDR-TB patients were present in the
ward. No MDR-TB case was diagnosed in the HIV
ward after February 1994. These results provide evi-
dence that implementation of an increased index of
suspicion for TB, rapid diagnostic techniques, appro-
priate isolation of patients, prohibition of patients
under TB isolation from leaving their rooms, and re-
striction in day-hospital admissions, even in the ab-
sence of engineering control measures, greatly de-
creased patient-to-patient MDR-TB transmission in
this outbreak. Furthermore, more aggressive treat-
ment regimens (five- or six-drug combinations) used
in later patients may have resulted in decreased infec-
tivity, although this could not be confirmed because
complete follow-up of smear conversions was not
always performed.
Rigorous application of administrative and source
control measures has been shown to be effective in re-
ducing nosocomial transmission in several other
MDR-TB outbreak investigations.1,16 However, one
important limitation of our study is the lack of data
concerning patient-to-HCW transmission. In the
present outbreak, in fact, no MDR-TB case was ob-
served among exposed HCWs, but the rate of infection
among HCWs could not be assessed. In Italy, as well
as in several other European countries, HCWs are re-
quired to be vaccinated with BCG on starting em-
ployment, and thus periodic skin test screening is not
conducted, making it difficult to identify skin test
conversions. Given this important limitation, we can
only say that the simple measures adopted were prob-
ably effective in stopping TB transmission to patients,
while we cannot draw conclusions regarding the risk
of infection among HCWs. Stroud et al.,15 who evalu-
ated the impact of infection control measures at
Roosevelt Hospital in New York City, demonstrated
that the risk of patient-to-patient transmission was
greatly reduced or prevented before negative pressure
was achieved in all isolation rooms, whereas only the in-
troduction of negative pressure and protective barriers
allowed patient-to-HCW transmission to be prevented.
A special feature of the present investigation is the
availability of results of the investigation of house-
hold contacts of MDR-TB cases. These data may be
useful in quantifying, at least in part, the impact of a
nosocomial MDR-TB outbreak in the community.
The observed active disease rate was 4%, which is
considerably higher than expected. According to
Etkind,17 in fact, on average 1% of identified persons
in close contact with a TB case will already have pro-
gressed to active disease. The higher rate of progres-
sion can be attributed to the fact that the prevalence
of HIV infection among household contacts was quite
high, as demonstrated by the fact that three of the
four secondary cases were HIV-positive. Rodrigo et
al. have recently reported that the risk of generating
secondary cases changes according to the social char-
acteristics of the index case: the risk is significantly
greater when the index case is an intravenous drug
user (IDU).18 Thus, the occurrence of a nosocomial
MDR-TB outbreak can have a greater impact than
that determined only on the basis of transmission
inside the hospital. The expected impact on the com-
munity of IDUs co-infected with MDR-TB and HIV is
probably greater due to the characteristics of the envi-
ronment in which they live.
The present report points out that the transmission
of MDR-TB among HIV patients in institutional set-
tings should be considered a serious threat. Several
factors can contribute to an increasing risk of MDR-
TB outbreaks in Europe: 1) the increasing number of
HIV-infected IDUs developing active TB19–21 who are
also at risk of poor compliance with antituberculosis
therapy;22 2) the increasing incidence of TB in many
areas21 and the high prevalence of HIV infection
among persons in some institutional settings; and 3)
the inadequacy of infection control practices and iso-
lation facilities in many institutional settings.
The mobility of HIV-infected patients, both
within and between hospitals and health care facili-
ties, can increase the potential for nosocomial TB
transmission in different institutions. MDR-TB is a
serious threat, but drug-susceptible TB is transmit-
ted under the same conditions, and unrecognised
transmission is probably occurring in other institu-
tions. Moreover, hospitals seem to be poorly pre-
pared to face a dramatic increase of infectious TB
cases among HIV patients: isolation facilities are not
adequate and renovations are costly. The results of this
investigation suggest that the implementation of rig-
orous infection control was effective in controlling
the outbreak; however, if MDR-TB is expected to
increase, it will be necessary to assure adequate iso-
lation of patients.
In conclusion, preventing institutional transmis-
sion of MDR-TB among HIV-infected individuals
should be considered as a public health priority in
European countries also, as should improving aware-
ness of TB in all institutions caring for HIV patients
and monitoring compliance with recommended
infection control practices. Moreover, efforts should
be focused on developing guidelines that take into
account the scarcity of European hospitals capable
of meeting the CDC standard for isolation rooms. A
good example is represented by the guidelines recently
issued in the United Kingdom, which specify mini-
mum requirements for the isolation of patients,
reserving negative pressure rooms for specific high-
risk patients with suspected or proven TB.24
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R É S U M É
CADRE : Entre octobre 1992 et février 1994, 33 cas de
tuberculose à germes multirésistants (MDR-TB) furent
diagnostiqués chez les patients infectés par le virus de
l’immunodéficience humaine (VIH) et hospitalisés dans
une service VIH à Milan. Cette éclosion faisait partie
d’une éclosion beaucoup plus étendue dont le point de
départ était situé dans un autre hôpital et qui fut proba-
blement transmise par l’intermédiaire d’un patient.
OBJECTIF : Evaluer les facteurs de risque de transmission
et l’efficience des mesures de contrôle de l’infection.
SCHÉMA : 1) Suivi actif des patients soumis au risque ; 2)
étude de cohorte parmi les patients infectés par le VIH,
exposés aux cas de MDR-TB avant et après la mise en
œuvre des mesures de contrôle de l’infection ; 3)
dépistage des contacts étroits des cas de MDR-TB ; et 4)
typage moléculaire par analyse du polymorphisme de
longueur des fragments de restriction (RFLP).
RÉSULTATS : Le risque de MDR-TB est plus élevé chez
les patients dont les décomptes lymphocytaires CD4
sont plus bas et dont l’exposition au risque fut plus
longue. Aucune différence n’a été observée en ce qui con-
cerne le risque quotidien pour les patients hospitalisés
vis à vis des patients de l’hôpital de jour ou en rapport
avec l’éloignement de la chambre par rapport au cas
contagieux. Une MDR-TB s’est développée chez 26
(28,9%) des 90 patients exposés avant la mise en œuvre
des mesures de contrôle de l’infection (c’est à dire entre
octobre 1992 et juin 1993), alors que la MDR-TB n’est
apparue chez aucun des 44 patients exposés exclusive-
ment après cette mise en œuvre, malgré la présence per-
sistante de cas de MDR-TB contagieux dans le service.
CONCLUSION : Des mesures de contrôle simples sont
efficaces pour réduire la transmission nosocomiale de
manière significative parmi les patients.
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R E S U M E N
MARCO DE REFERENCIA : Entre octubre de 1992 y
febrero de 1994 fueron diagnosticados 33 casos de
tuberculosis multirresistente (MDR-TB) en pacientes
positivos al virus de la inmunodeficiencia humana (VIH)
hospitalizados en un centro de VIH en Milán. Este brote
fue parte de otro brote mucho mayor, que se inició en
otro hospital y que probablamente se trasmitió a través
de un paciente.
OBJETIVO : Evaluar los factores de riesgo para la tras-
misión y la eficacia de las medidas de control de la infección.
MÉTODO : 1) Seguimiento activo de los pacientes expues-
tos ; 2) estudio de las cohortes entre los pacientes VIH
positivos expuestos a los casos MDR-TB antes y después
de la implementación de las medidas de control ; 3) catas-
tro de los contactos íntimos de los casos MDR-TB ; y
4) tipificación molecular por el análisis de polimorfismo
de restricción de longitud de fragmentos (RFLP).
RESULTADOS : El riesgo de MDR-TB era mayor en los
pacientes con porcentajes más bajos de linfocitos CD4 y
mayor duración de la exposición. No se observó diferen-
cia en el riesgo diario entre los pacientes hospitalizados y
los atendidos en el hospital de día, ni en la distancia a la
sala de hospitalización de un caso contagioso. De los 90
pacientes expuestos antes de la implementación de las
medidas de control de la infección (a saber, octubre 1997
a junio 1993) 26 casos (28,9%) desarrollaron MDR-TB,
mientras que ninguno de los 44 pacientes expuestos exclu-
sivamente después de implementar las medidas desarrolló
MDR-TB, a pesar de la presencia permanente de casos
contagiosos de MDR-TB en el servicio.
CONCLUSIÓN : Las medidas simples de control fueron
efectivas para reducir significativamente la trasmisión
intrahospitalaria entre los enfermos.
